Location Verification Systems in Emerging Wireless Networks by Yan, Shihao & Malaney, Robert
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
33
48
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 12
 Ju
l 2
01
3
1
Location Verification Systems in Emerging
Wireless Networks
Shihao Yan, Robert Malaney
School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, UNSW, Sydney, Australia
Abstract—As location-based techniques and applications be-
come ubiquitous in emerging wireless networks, the verification
of location information will become of growing importance.
This has led in recent years to an explosion of activity related
to location verification techniques in wireless networks, with
a specific focus on Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) being
evident. Such focus is largely due to the mission-critical nature
of vehicle location verification within the ITS scenario. In this
work we review recent research in wireless location verification
related to the vehicular network scenario. We particularly focus
on location verification systems that rely on formal mathematical
classification frameworks, showing how many systems are either
partially or fully encompassed by such frameworks.
I. INTRODUCTION
As location-based techniques and services become ubiqui-
tous in emerging wireless networks, the authentication of lo-
cation information has attracted considerable research interest
in recent years [1–12]. In early wireless positioning systems,
accuracy and performance issues were to the fore, with the
authentication of location information relegated to a secondary
concern. This is now changing. Many current mainstream
wireless positioning systems, such as the now ubiquitous WiFi
positioning systems, are highly vulnerable to location-spoofing
attacks due to their openness and wide public availability [13,
14]. In particular, in many configurations wireless network
positioning systems are client-based [15, 16], meaning that
only the client (the device whose location is to be verified)
can obtain its location directly. The wider communications
network can then only obtain the client’s position through
requesting the client to report its location. Obviously, the client
can easily spoof or falsify its location. In other configurations,
systems that attempt to directly locate a client using signal
metrics, such as received signal strength (RSS) measurements,
are vulnerable to manipulation of the signal metric by the
client prior to transmission [17–20].
It is the purpose of this paper to review those works that
attempt to formalize location spoofing attempts. We will be
focussed on the notion of location verification, meaning that
we will assume a location (presumed to be the actual true
location) for the client is either publicly announced by the
client or is assumed to be a priori publicly known. We refer
to this announced (or known) location as the claimed location.
The verification systems we discuss are then instructed to use
all available signal metrics in order to classify whether the
client is at the claimed location or not [21-54]. It is important
to note that location verification (or authentication) defined in
this way results a quite different mathematical problem (and
different outcome) to that posed by the more usual location
acquisition problem [15–20].
The importance of location verification can be witnessed
by the many adverse effects spoofed location information
can have on a variety of network functions [2, 4, 5, 8, 55–62].
For example, in generic wireless network scenarios, spoofed
position information can lead to packet delivery in geographic
routing protocols [57–59] being reduced dramatically [55, 56].
Performance of location-based access control can be decreased
markedly by spoofed locations [60–62]. As mentioned in
[47], WiFi, Cellular and GPS position information within the
E911 framework can be easily spoofed by clients, in order
to maliciously attract emergency services to false locations.
However, the adverse effects of location spoofing are arguably
more severe in the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) sce-
nario [2, 4, 5, 8]. Most importantly, in the collision avoidance
aspects of VANETs location spoofing can be life-threatening.
Beyond such critical effects, a malicious vehicle might spoof
its position in order to cause serious service disruptions to
other users [2, 4, 5], or to enhance in a selfish manner its own
functionality within the network [35, 44]. Authentication of
position information within VANETs forms the focus of the
rest of this paper.
In this review paper, the approach which will gather most
of our attention is the exploitation of the physical properties
of wireless communication channels as a means to derive
location verification. Such an approach eliminates (or at least
drastically reduces) any dependency on complex higher-layer
secrecy techniques such as encryption and cryptographic key
management. Use of the properties of the wireless commu-
nication channels also allows us to more formally examine
what the optimal performance expectations are for a Location
Verification System (LVS).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details a generic formal LVS and presents some associated
performance evaluation criteria. In Section III we review ap-
plication of our generic LVS to the emerging VANET scenario.
In Section IV we discuss other location verification systems
that although not targeted directly at the VANET scenario -
can be readily adjusted to work in that scenario. Section V
draws some concluding remarks and future directions.
II. GENERIC LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we first present the generic system model
of an LVS, and discuss the differences between an LVS and
a localization system. Then, the receiver operating curves
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a generic location verification system.
(ROC) used in an LVS are discussed. Finally, we present two
frameworks for optimizing an LVS.
A. Binary Decision Rule for an LVS
Location verification is different from the more general
problem of locating a user in wireless networks [49]. A
key obvious difference between an LVS and a positioning
system is that the output of an LVS is usually a binary
decision (yes/no) while the output of a positioning system is an
estimated location of a user. Fig. 1 depicts a generic location
verification system. Here, the claimed location is an LVS input
that is provided by the client being verified, whom henceforth
we refer to as the prover. The observations available at
the verifiers, which perform location verifications, are also
inputs to the LVS. The LVS aims at verifying a prover’s
claimed location by comparing these inputs and checking in
a systematic manner whether all inputs are compatible. If
compatible (incompatible), a yes (no) decision is returned by
the LVS.
Due to the binary outputs, location verification can be
modeled as a binary decision theory problem. Thus, a decision
rule is embedded in an LVS, which can be written as
T
D1
≥
<
D0
λ, (1)
where T is the test statistic, λ is the threshold corresponding
to T , and D0 and D1 are the binary decisions inferring the
prover of interest is legitimate or malicious, respectively. The
test statistic T is derived from the LVS inputs, the form of
which varies with different location verification algorithms.
As mentioned above, the principal aim of an LVS is to verify
if a prover is at the claimed location. Of course we have to
include noise (for example, that in the location acquisition
problem that results in location error) in such a framework,
but that is usually encapsulated within the classifier logic (i.e.
implicit probability distributions) of the LVS. In addition, if the
verification was changed from a claimed position to a claimed
area (e.g. a room) then the systems implicit probability distri-
butions would be altered accordingly.
B. ROC’s for an LVS
From a statistical decision theory point of view, an LVS
can be modeled as a decision problem as shown in Fig. 2. In
this figure, X denotes the input of an LVS, of which the two
Fig. 2: Statistical decision theory model for an LVS [41].
realizations areH0 andH1. Here H0 represents the case where
the prover is at the claimed location (null hypothesis), and and
H1 represents a malicious prover not at the claimed location
(alternative hypothesis). As shown in Fig. 2, the output of an
LVS, Y , is also binary, and its realizations are D0 and D1.
The probabilities P (Dj |Hi) (i = 0, 1, j = 0, 1) represent for
a given input X the probabilities of deciding on an output
Y . The P (Dj |Hi) determine the performance of an LVS (e.g.
[41]).
The traditional method to evaluate a detection system uti-
lizes the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [63, 64], which in turn is
based on the false positive and detection rates. The false
positive rate is the probability of deciding incorrectly that a
legitimate prover is malicious, denoted by α = P (D1|H0).
The detection rate is the probability of deciding correctly that
a prover is malicious, which is presented as β = P (D1|H1).
Both the aforementioned rates are determined by T and λ. We
are expecting an LVS to provide a high detection rate and a
low false positive rate. But there is a tradeoff between the false
positive and detection rates. The ROC is used to demonstrate
this tradeoff, and is constructed by plotting β versus α. But
ROC in and by itself does not lead to an optimized setting
(e.g. [41]).
It is worth noting that the Neyman-Pearson Lemma states
that the likelihood ratio test is able to maximize the detection
rate for any given false positive rate [63, 64]. The likelihood
ratio is the ratio between the probability density functions of
the measurements under H0 and H1, respectively, and the
corresponding threshold T is derived assuming a given false
positive rate. However, determining the threshold T by such
a method does not provide for an overall optimization of an
LVS (e.g. [63], [64]).
C. Optimization Frameworks for an LVS
To optimize an LVS, some unique evaluation criterion
should be adopted as the performance metric. As mentioned
above the transition probabilities between X and Y determine
the performance of an LVS, thus the unique evaluation cri-
terion should be a function of such transition probabilities.
One widely used metric is the Bayes’s average cost, which is
defined as [64],
R =
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
CjiP (Dj |Hi)P (Hi), (2)
where Cji is the assigned cost associated with the decision
Dj given the hypothesis Hi, and P (H0) and P (H1) are
the a priori probabilities of the occurrence of H0 and H1,
3respectively. In this Bayesian framework, the optimal location
verification algorithm is the one which minimizes R. It is
worthwhile to note the Bayes’s average cost requires that both
Cji and P (Hi) are known a priori.
If the Cji’s are unknown, the MAP criterion can be adopted
[64], where the unique cost is determined through
RM = C10P (D1|H0)P (H0) + C01P (D0|H1)P (H1). (3)
Comparing (2) and (3), we can see that RM is a special case
of R with C00 = C11 = 0, and C10 = C01 = 1. Thus,
the MAP criterion is well suited for scenarios where the cost
of rejecting a legitimate user is equal to that of accepting a
malicious user. In addition, RM can be reduced to the Total
Error when P (H0) = P (H1) = 0.5 [52].
Although the Bayes’s average cost, MAP, and Total Error
can be used to optimize an LVS, they all possess a weakness
- they are dependent on subjective cost values. In the Bayes’s
average cost we have to predetermine the costs for all possible
decisions. However, properly determining the true cost to the
network for each decision is in practice next to impossible.
For example, what is the detailed cost to a VANET where one
vehicle spoofs its location information? Clearly that true cost is
subjective and dependent on numerous factors and application
scenarios. Similarly, C10 and C01 are both set to one in the
MAP criterion and Total Error, but the cost of accepting a
malicious prover is likely much larger than that of rejecting a
legitimate prover.
To solve this subjective problem in the optimization of an
LVS, an information-theoretic framework has been proposed
in [40, 41], where the cost for each possible decision is not
assigned subjectively, but rather objectively. In this framework,
the mutual information between the system input and output is
utilized as the optimization criterion. The mutual information
between X and Y is defined as
I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ), (4)
where H(X) is the input entropy representing the uncertainty
of the system input (determined by the a priori probabilities),
H(X |Y ) is the conditional entropy of X given Y , which
measures the uncertainty of the input given the output (de-
termined by the a priori and transition probabilities). Thus,
I(X ;Y ) measures the uncertainty reduction of the input given
the output, and the optimal information-theoretic location
verification algorithm is the one which maximizes I(X ;Y ).
Comparing with the Bayesian framework, the information-
theoretic framework only assumes knowledge of the a priori
probabilities.
In closing this section we note the following important
point. Although the likelihood ratio has been shown to be
the optimal test statistic in most frameworks, this ratio is
difficult to obtain in practice without some assumptions on
an attacker’s behavior and location. The reason for this is
that the likelihood function under H1 is directly dependent
on the attack strategy adopted by the malicious prover and the
actual (true) location of the malicious prover, both of which
are unknown a priori to the LVS. The impact of these key
uncertainties with regard to optimization of the LVS forms
part of the following discussions.
III. LOCATION VERIFICATION IN VANETS
In this section we review applications of our generic LVS
framework to the emerging VANETs scenario. Firstly we
review works that only discuss the binary decision rule of
Section II-A. Secondly, we review works that also use the
ROC’s of Section II-B. Thirdly we review works that utilize
the optimization frameworks discussed in Section II-C.
A. Binary-Decision-Rule-Based Location Verification
In this subsection, we focus on the location verification al-
gorithms that only utilize the binary decision rule as discussed
in Section II-A. In these algorithms the threshold is physically
set to some system parameter (e.g. maximum communication
range, maximum velocity).
By exploiting the specific properties of VANETs, such as
high node density and mobility, the authors of [21] proposed
an autonomous scheme and a cooperative scheme to detect and
mitigate falsified locations. The acceptance range, mobility
grade and vehicle density are used in the binary decision
rule in the autonomous scheme, where the thresholds are
determined based on the maximum communication range,
maximum velocity and maximum density, respectively. The
test statistics used in the cooperative scheme, such as neighbor
tables, can only be obtained through cooperating with other
neighbor vehicles. The overall decision on a prover’s claimed
location is made by combining the local decisions with weight
factors. Since the proposed location verification is applied in
location-based routing protocols, in which it is assumed a ma-
licious vehicle does not forward the packet to the correct next
hop, the packet delivery ratio can be used as an performance
criterion. The proposed schemes in [21] provide the basis of
location verification in VANETs. Similar to [21], the authors
of [29] also proposed location verification algorithms based on
communication range, velocity and density, but extended their
test statistics to include travelled distance and map location.
The authors of [22] used the timestamp of when a packet
was sent (within which the claimed location is embedded)
to detect malicious vehicles (i.e. vehicles who spoof location
information) in VANETs. The timestamp check is to ensure
the received packet is neither too old nor too early. In [22] a
rate-limiting mechanism was also proposed. In this mechanism
if the rate of packets originating from a prover exceeds a
predetermined maximum packet transmit rate, the prover will
be detected as malicious. As in [21], the work of [22] is in the
context of location-based routing, and the packet delivery ratio
could have been used as a performance criterion. However, the
performance metric used in [21] was packet end-to-end delay,
which is also a viable metric when it is assumed a malicious
vehicle does not forward the packet to the correct next hop.
A secure, infrastructure-less, and cooperative location verifi-
cation scheme was proposed in [24] with the aim of preventing
an attacker from spoofing that it is further from a verifier. In
this scheme, the verifier first estimates the prover’s location
based on time difference of arrival (TDOA) measurements,
with the help of a common neighbor (of both the verifier
and prover). Then, the Euclidean distance error between the
estimated and claimed locations of the prover is compared with
4TABLE I: Binary decision rule based location verification
algorithms for VANETs
Ref. Test Statistics Performance Criteria
[21]
acceptance range, mobility
grade, maximum density,
neighbor tables, etc.
packet delivery ratio
[22] timestamp, acceptance range,
velocity, packet transmit rate packet end-to-end delay
[23]
error distance between radar
estimated location and claimed
location
time required to detect a mali-
cious vehicle
[24]
Euclidean distance error be-
tween estimated and claimed
locations
packet delivery ratio, packet
end-to-end delay
[27]
difference between track
records and claimed positions,
neighbor tables
not provided
[28]
TOA of challenge-response
message, acceptance range,
roadway map, velocity
area of intersection region
[29] communication range, speed
and density, moved distance packet delivery ratio
[31] difference between measured
and calculated round trip time
difference between measured
and calculated round trip time
and distances
[37]
difference between triangula-
tion calculated and claimed
distances
channel capacity utilization,
packet delivery ratio, response
time
[42]
Euclidean distance error be-
tween estimated location based
on TDOA measurements and
claimed location
average location estimation er-
ror
a distance related to the expected processing delay (assuming
a legitimate prover). The packet delivery ratio and end-to-end
delay are applied to evaluate the proposed location verification
algorithm, since (again) the work of [24] is in context of
location-based routing protocols.
In [23] the authors utilized on-board radar systems to verify
a vehicle’s claimed location (obtained through a GPS system).
Considering the system noise, the authors first determined
the GPS position tolerance shadow and radar position toler-
ance shadow, separately. The proposed algorithm accepts the
prover’s claimed location if there is an intersection between the
GPS and radar position shadows, and vice versa. The threshold
and performance of the proposed location verification algo-
rithm is determined by the accuracy of the GPS and radar
systems. The time required to detect a malicious user is used
as the evaluation criterion. Again, the work of [23] is in the
context of location-based routing protocols, and packet end-to-
end delay and delivery ratio are also used. The authors of [23]
also proposed in [27] a passive location verification algorithm
which can work in scenarios where the on-board radar is not
available (or does not work due to obstacles). This passive
algorithm first creates a track record of location reports by
using neighbor tables. A vehicle’s neighbor table contains a list
of other vehicles’ identifications and locations that are within
its range. If a prover’s claimed location greatly deviates from
the majority of the track record, the algorithm will classify the
prover as malicious.
A location verification algorithm for VANETs in the context
of location-based routing was proposed in [28] based on the
notion of trusted neighbor (a vehicle whose location has been
verified). The proposed algorithm is carried out in two steps.
In the first step, the time of arrival (TOA) of the challenge-
response message between a verifier and a prover is utilized
to detect distance reduction attacks. In the second step, the
verifier cooperates with one of its trusted neighbors to verify
if the prover is at an intersection region determined by the
verifier and the trusted neighbor. The area of the intersection
region is used as the performance criterion.
In [31] a scheme, in which a verifier measures the round
trip propagation time between the verifier and the prover (by
exchanging challenge-response messages), and compares this
with a calculated round trip time (obtained according to the
prover’s claimed location) is studied via detailed numerical
simulations. This work is notable in which it concludes that
such easily deplorable schemes are seemingly reliable in rural,
urban and Manhattan scenarios.
To overcome the no line-of-sight (LOS) problem in location
verification systems, a cooperative location verification scheme
was proposed in [37]. The proposed scheme focused on
verifying a prover with no LOS to a verifier. To estimate
the distance between the prover and verifier, this protocol
requests help from a cooperative vehicle, which has LOS
communications with both the prover and the verifier. The
distances from the cooperator to the prover, and from the
cooperator to the verifier, can be estimated (e.g. via TDOA, or
TOA), which then allows for the distance between the prover
and verifier to be calculated. In addition, the claimed distance
between the verifier and the prover’s claimed location can be
calculated. The main point of this protocol is its ability to
verify vehicle locations that could not otherwise be verified
due to obstacles.
The authors of [42] proposed a location verification algo-
rithm dedicated to VANETs, where a moving verifier (vehicle)
can verify a static prover’s claimed location independently of
road-side units and other neighbor vehicles. In this algorithm,
the moving verifier measures the TOA of signals transmit-
ted by the static prover at three different locations along
its trajectory. Then, the location of the prover is estimated
based on the three measurements using the multilateration
technique. The Euclidean distance error between the estimated
and claimed locations of the prover is used as the test statistic,
and the corresponding threshold is set as the average position
estimation error.
The detailed test statistics and performance criteria used in
the location verification algorithms reviewed in this subsection
are provided in Table I.
B. Location Verification Using ROC’s
In this subsection, we will review the location verification
systems, not only utilizing the binary decision rule, but also
using both or either of the false positive rate and detection
rate (used to construct a ROC) discussed in Section II-B. In
these location verification systems, the threshold in the binary
decision rule could be set according to a given false positive
rate or detection rate.
A location verification solely based on messages exchange
among neighbor vehicles was proposed in [25]. The authors
focused on detecting a malicious vehicle which spoofs its posi-
tion as the farthest one (within range) from the packet sender,
5TABLE II: Location verification algorithms using Neyman-
Pearson criteria for VANETs
Ref. Test Statistics Performance Criteria
[25] number of neighbor vehicles detection rate, packet delivery
ratio, packet end-to-end delay
[32]
two-hop neighbors based plau-
sibility area, RSS measure-
ments
detection rate, false positive
rate
[34]
map-guided trajectory based
plausibility area, RSS mea-
surements
detection rate, false positive
rate
[38]
Difference between estimated
distance based on TDOA and
calculated distance based on
claimed location
detection rate, packet delivery
ratio
[43] overall trustworthiness of a
message
false positive rate, detection
rate, false negative rate, true
negative rate
[44]
error distance between esti-
mated and claimed locations,
variance of this error distance
false positive rate, detection
rate
so that it will be selected as the next hop in geographic routing
protocols. In [25] it is assumed each vehicle is equipped
with two directional antennas: forwards and backwards, and
each vehicle constructs two corresponding tables of one-
hop neighbors. The decision on a prover is made though
exchanging and comparing such neighbor tables. The theoretic
detection rate is derived as a function of the vehicle density.
As expected, it is found that the larger the network density, the
higher that malicious vehicles will be detected by the proposed
system.
A location verification algorithm based on a vehicle’s direct
connectivity (one-hop connectivity) with other vehicles was
proposed in [32]. In this algorithm one-hop information is
exchanged between vehicles so that each vehicle can build
a two-hop neighborhood connectivity diagram. Using such
diagrams, each vehicle can then attempt to verify the location
information being passed to it. Each vehicle does this by
constructing a plausibility area. Simply put, if a vehicle cannot
hear directly from another vehicle, say vehicle A, at some
location (since that vehicle is two hops away), then it should
not be able to hear directly from a prover who claims to be
further away than vehicle A. Similarly, in [34] a map-guided
trajectory-based location verification algorithm was proposed
in which the plausibility area is constructed by using a prover’s
history location and map information (e.g. road dimensions).
In order to prevent the distance enlargement attack in
VANETs, the authors of [38] also proposed a cooperative
verification algorithm to verify a prover’s claimed location.
In this scheme, both the verifier and cooperator can measure
the TOA of the challenge-response messages from a prover.
By using such TOA measurements, both the verifier and
cooperator can conduct local verification on whether the prover
launched distance reduction attacks. In such location verifica-
tion algorithms, the test statistic is the difference between the
TOA calculated distance and claimed distance derived from
the prover’s claimed location, and the threshold is determined
using the processing delay of the challenge-response message.
Since the cooperator is selected so as to locate the prover
between the verifier and cooperator, the proposed cooperative
algorithm is able to detect the distance enlargement attack. In
the simulations of [38], the detection rate is used to evaluate
the proposed LVS.
In contrast to the previously reviewed works which focus
on the one-hop location verification problem, the authors of
[43] proposed a beacon-based trust management system, which
combines the one-hop and multiple-hop verification algorithms
to thwart internal attackers in VANETs. In the proposed
system, the authors adopted the cosine similarity [23] between
estimated vector (including position and velocity) and claimed
vector in order to determine the beacon trustworthiness of a
neighbor vehicle. The Tanimoto coefficient between history
beacon messages and received event messages is utilized to
calculate the one-hop event trustworthiness, based on which
an algorithm to determine the multiple-hop trustworthiness
of an event message is also provided. Then, the Dempster-
Shafer theory [65] is applied to combine all local event
trustworthiness and determine the overall trustworthiness of
an event message. Finally, the overall decision on the beacon
message is made by comparing the overall trustworthiness
with a predetermined threshold of trust degree. Both the false
positive and detection rates are utilized as performance criteria.
Besides location spoofing attacks, Sybil attacks may also
compromise some location-based services in VANETs. The
Sybil attack refers to the scenario where a malicious vehicle
illegitimately adopts multiple identities or locations to realize
its attack purposes. This type attack is possibly launched by a
selfish driver to mimic traffic congestion at some location on
the road (used say as a mechanism to deter other vehicles
from driving into his planned path). To detect such Sybil
attacks, two location verification algorithms based on RSS
measurements were proposed in [44]. In the first algorithm of
[44], the verifier first estimates the prover’s location through
the Minimum Mean-Square Error on the distribution of RSS
measurements. Then, the distance error between the estimated
and claimed locations is utilized as the test statistic. In
the second algorithm, the test statistic is derived from the
distributions of such distance errors under H0 and H1, and
the threshold is derived from a given false positive rate. In the
conducted simulations, [44] adopted the detection rate as the
performance criterion.
C. Information-Theoretic Location Verification Systems
In this subsection we will discuss some results from the
information-theoretic optimization framework [40, 41] dis-
cussed in Section II-C. We then discuss the advantages of
the information-theoretic framework relative to the Bayesian
framework, in the context of location verification.
In [40], the verifier first uses the Maximum Likelihood
Estimator to estimate a prover’s location based on RSS
measurements. The Mahalanobis distance error between the
estimated and claimed positions of the prover is utilized as
the test statistic in the binary decision rule. The corresponding
threshold is selected by maximizing the mutual information
between the input and output of the LVS. It is worth noting
that a threshold selected in this manner does not completely
optimize an LVS since the test statistic is not optimized.
6Following [40], the authors of [41] proved that the likeli-
hood ratio is the optimal test statistic in terms of maximizing
the mutual information between input and output of an LVS.
With such a test statistic an optimal information-theoretic LVS
was obtained. To deploy the optimal information-theoretic
location verification, [41] also proposed three threat models,
where the likelihood functions for RSS measurements can be
obtained or approximated in closed forms. It is worth noting
that the information-theoretic and MAP frameworks lead to
the same decision rule (likelihood ratio test with the same
threshold) in the special case where P (H0) = P (H1) = 0.5,
and the likelihood functions underH0 andH1 follow Gaussian
distributions with the same variance.
Besides the objective nature of the optimization metric
discussed in Section II-C, the authors of [41] also showed
another useful property of information-theoretic framework -
the optimized threshold is not very sensitive to the a priori
probabilities, as shown by Fig. 9 in [41]. From this figure,
we can see that the optimal threshold in the MAP framework
which minimizes RM for the likelihood ratio test is a linear
function of P (H1). This can be explained by the fact that the
optimal threshold for minimizing RM is P (H0)/P (H1) [64].
However, the optimal threshold in the information-theoretic
framework that maximizes I(X ;Y ) for the likelihood ratio
test converges to a constant number as P (H1) approaches
zero. It is important to note that knowledge on the a priori
probabilities is very difficult to obtain, and in practice can
only be assumed or roughly estimated. In most practical
verification scenarios one could anticipate P (H1) being quite
small. Therefore, the behavior shown by Fig. 9 in [41], for the
optimal information-theoretic threshold, provides information-
theoretic frameworks a significant pragmatic advantage rela-
tive to Bayesian frameworks.
IV. LOCATION VERIFICATIONS APPLICABLE TO VANETS
In this section, we review some other location verification
algorithms that, although not dedicated directly to VANETs,
can be readily adjusted to the VANET scenario.
Since collecting RSSs does not require extra hardware,
many location verification systems for general wireless net-
works were developed based on RSS measurements. In [3], the
authors proposed an algorithm to detect location spoofing at-
tacks by matching the input instantaneous measurements with
the normal signal fingerprints. Through exploiting experimen-
tal test results, the authors of [6] found that the RSSs follow a
mixture of two Gaussian distributions if the prover and verifier
are both equipped with two antennas. To perform the verifi-
cation, [6] employed a likelihood ratio test constructed from
the instantaneous measurements and expected normal profiles.
An RSS fingerprints based location verification algorithm was
also proposed in [48], where it was observed that solely
analyzing the residual of RSS measurements can not robustly
detect location spoofing attacks. However, if this residual is
used referenced to a claimed location, it can provide for a
verification algorithm robust against various forms of attacks.
In [52], the location verification was formulated as a statistical
significance testing problem. The authors analyzed the spatial
correlation of RSS measurements to detect location attacks,
and derived theoretic false positive and detection rates in the
1-Dimension and 2-Dimension physical spaces. The authors
of [52] also optimized the threshold in the proposed binary
decision rule by minimizing the Total Error, and proposed
a location verification algorithm against spoofing and Sybil
attacks by using clustering methods algorithms [66]. The
algorithms of [3] [6] [52] [48] are representative of many
similar RSS based wireless local verification algorithms. In
principal they could all be readily adopted to the VANET
environment.
Some generic challenge-response based location verifica-
tion algorithms for wireless networks have been proposed in
the literature e.g. [7, 45, 50]. The well-known Echo protocol
was proposed in [45] and is based on the delay of the
two challenge-response messages sent through wireless and
ultrasonic channels. The relative delay in the two channels is
compared with the ideal theoretic delay, the latter of which is
derived according to a prover’s claimed location. Applying
the Echo protocol in VANETs requires that the vehicles
are equipped with both wireless and ultrasonic hardware
for communications. A location verification protocol with
hidden or mobile base stations was presented in [50]. The
hidden or mobile base stations can securely estimate the
distances to the prover since the locations of the hidden or
mobile base stations are assumed unknown to the prover. The
distance error between the estimated and claimed locations
of a prover is compared with some threshold as a means
to verification. This algorithm can be used in VANETs if
the locations of some verifiers are not publicly known. In
[7], several location verification algorithms were proposed
based on power-modulated challenge-response method to de-
tect malicious vehicles. Adopting power-modulated location
verification algorithms to VANETs, would be straightforward
if the verifiers in VANETs (vehicle or base stations) possess
the ability to adjust their transmit power.
The authors of [51] proposed a probabilistic location veri-
fication algorithm for a wireless sensor network (WSN) with
high node density. In such networks, the number of hops a
packet (sent by a prover) traverses in order to reach a verifier,
is shown to be probabilistically dependent on the Euclidean
distance between the prover and the verifier. The proposed
algorithm in [51] verifies a prover’s claimed location by
checking the correlation between the number of hops and the
Euclidean distance (which is calculated based on the prover’s
claimed location). Assuming a high node density for the
WSN, two location verification algorithms were proposed in
[54]. These algorithms explored the inconsistencies between a
prover’s claimed location and the verifiers one-hop neighbor’s
determination that it can hear the prover. Since the algorithms
in [51] and [54] assumed a high node density for the WSN,
applying these algorithms in VANETs requires that the vehicle
density is high (suitable for urban scenarios).
Again, we point out that all the works discussed in this
last section are just representative (not exhaustive) of location
verification algorithms proposed for other wireless networks.
We have tried to classify them into three classes, RSS-based,
challenge-response based, and high-node-density based . Other
7classes exist, which again with some thought could be altered
in some fashion so as to be applicable to the VANET scenario.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have outlined generic frameworks for
location verification in the context of the VANET scenario. We
have also reviewed how much of the exiting literature on loca-
tion verification with VANETs falls within such frameworks.
With the Intelligent Transport System scenario now becoming
a key focus of government transportation departments around
the world, the deployment of actual VANETs is close to
reality. A mission-critical component of such networks will
be location verification. As such, the research reviewed in this
paper is likely to be of increasing importance.
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